For the next couple of days, I'll be giving you summaries from the MBA's Servicing and Technology Conference.  As you might suspect, the sessions focus on the 'hot' topics.

Here are the sessions that have my attention:

• Federal legislation, regulatory reform, and the political climate, including REMIC reform, banking reform, risk-based capital requirements, the "new" CMBS 2.0, the rating agencies, and accounting changes
• the current economic market, including maturing loans, property markets, originations (or lack thereof) and unemployment
• increased loan surveillance
• using technology to improve the servicing process (I'm on the panel covering this topic)
• using social networking tools with a business focus
• using technology tools for mitigating risk
• challenges facing the "new" CMBS 2.0
• loan defaults and workouts
• lessons learned (what works and what could be better)

This is my tenth time to attend this conference.  As you see from these topics, this conference always is relevant and very practical.  I'll be back later today with my first summary.

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James Ruiz recently wrote a piece, published in the Texas Lawyer, summarizing the February 10, 2010 report (“Commercial Real Estate Loses and the Risk to Financial Stability”) issued by the Congressional Oversight Panel. (continue reading link below). It is a good summary of the Panel’s perspective of the credit problems in commercial real estate, and addresses the REMIC issues inherent in modifications of CMBS loans and the impact of two new accounting standards (Statement of Financial Standards 166 & 167).

Earlier, I posted a summary of the report, and commented that if financial reform is going to occur, the window is narrow given the August start of the mid-term Congressional re-election campaign season. As you might know, I’have been blogging\following the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 [link] as it makes its way through the Congressional process. 

It’s time to step back and ask the all-important questions: so what does all this mean? What is the big-picture? Where is this going?

Here’s my list of some of the answers to those important questions:

1. The Good: ‘Return’ of the unregulated CRE lenderr. in the near future, unregulated lenders will play a very important role in CRE finance. This will mean new opportunity from a new source.
2. The Bad: ‘Extend and Pretend’ and More Defaults. This will mean continuing opportunity for special servicing and asset management - but the RTC is not the model.
3. The Uncertain CMBS 2.0: Practical and important structural challenges abound before the new CMBS (“CMBS 2.0”) will include pools of loans from multiple borrowers, in amounts that will have a meaningful impact on the CRE finance market.
4. The Not Now For Covered Bonds: the current focus is on CMBS 2.0, although covered bond legislation was introduced by members of the House Financial Services Committee – Capital Markets Subcommittee. Why isn't’t this legislation getting more attention?

Based on this list, the next 2-4 years will look like this: CRE finance = Good+Bad.

Yes, we’ll have good and bad at the same time (with more of the later in the near-term).

Let me briefly explain:

#1. “Unregulated Lenders” Will Play An Important Role In CRE Financee: By this phrase, I mean lenders who are not banks, savings and loans, credit unions, insurance companies or government sponsored entities (such as Fannie Mae). In addition, these lenders will be different from “hard money” or “hot money” commercial lenders, who as lenders of last resort offer loan terms that resemble predatory lending.

Instead, these lenders will be mortgage REITS and other lenders whose base or core sources of funds are not the Federal Reserve, insurance premiums or Federal Government sponsorship (which I call the “traditional sources of CRE finance”). The pricing and terms will be more favorable to the borrower than offered by the "hard money" or "hot money" lenders, and more expensive than terms than offered by traditional sources of CRE finance. In my description of this middle-tier CRE finance group, I’m thinking of mortgage REITs such as CreXus and of mortgage finance companies like the former Lomas & Nettleton.

What leads me to this conclusion?

• One study reports that traditional sources of CRE finance only offer @ $200Bill of funds annually for CRE lending (based upon a recent three year average of loan originations by this group).
• The same study shows that CRE lending needs for maturing debt will exceed this amount by a total of $500Bill in 2010, 2011 & 2012.
• This “funding gap” doesn't’t take into account funding for defaulted CRE loans (by way of financing purchases of notes and REO from lenders and servicers). So, the gap really is larger than $500Bill
  
  What will be the source of funding to “fill” this gap?
   
• CMBS 2.0 will not fill this funding gap any time soon. True, banks and life companies are forming CMBS 2.0 programs – and we’re working on several of them. However, at the CMSA January conference, in an informal poll of investors, 58% of the investors believed that “CMBS 1.0” style multi-borrower, fixed rate pools will be return no sooner than 2012 (or even later); and 69% of the investors believed that annual new CMBS issuances would not exceed $100bill until 2013. (click on this link to my blogs from the conference for more information; and\or search TTFL blog using the term “CMSA” for more information.)  The message is simple: CMBS 2.0 probably is not a near term reality for multi-borrower loan pools in an amount necessary to close this gap  – which also is why the new CMBS 2.0 programs will be underwriting loans as if they were going to hold them on their books – and not sell them in a securitization.
• Bank CRE lending will not fill the gap for several reasons:
  -  Banks credit allocations for CRE will decrease for the near term (my guess: 3-5 years). Recently, the US Controller of the Currency spoke at the annual convention of the Independent Community Bankers of America, and called on policymakers to devote special attention to the CRE lending concentrations at banks. He then suggested a lengthy list of options, all of which would reduce lending risks AND result in less capital available for CRE lending.  Regional and community banks have high CRE loan concentrations.  For example, I've been told that the CRE lending concentration for banks governed by the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank is @ 26%. Simply too, too much CRE loans on the bank portfolios.
  -  The Wall Street Journal reported on March 15Th that in the coming weeks, the Financial Accounting Standards Board is likely to propose that banks expand their use of market values for financial assets such as loans (called “mark-to-market”). If these accounting rules are implemented, then this will be another pressure on banks to make less capital available for CRE lending.
• Insurance company CRE lending will not fill the gap. Recently the Capital Adequacy Working Group of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC") voted to release for comment a proposal that might result in a large increase to the risk-based capital (“RBC”) charges for life company holdings of CRE mortgages.   If passed, this could significantly restrict the ability of some life companies to make capital available for CRE lending.

All of this points to opportunity for a new niche CRE lender.

#2. Extend and Pretend AND More Defaults:  as noted in our postings on the October 31, 2009 bank regulatory announcement, and at the CMSA January conference, the regulatory plan clearly is to avoid taking back CRE collateral if it has some reasonable basis for keeping the loan current. Many people, myself included, called for a quick RTC style take over of failed banks, with a quick disposition of the assets. Clearly, absent a change in the mark-to-market rules (described above), the perspective of the administration is that the current CRE crisis is NOT attributable to over building. Instead, it is a credit crisis unrelated to CRE. So, the plan seems to be extend until the fundamentals for the broader economic recovery firm up as evidenced by: increases in employment; improvement in consumer confidence and spending; etc.  In other words, treat the source of the problem, and not the symptoms.

However, default rates on CRE mortgages continue to climb (see my earlier posting).

So, unless and until we clear much of the over-leveraged CRE from the market (my “sub-prime commercial” product type), if you have expertise in distressed CRE, then you should be busy.

And, if your company can handle both the good AND the bad, then you’ll really be busy.

In the near future, I’ll cover #3 and #4.

If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please post your comments below.

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(This is the last in a series covering the MBA-CREF convention.  In contrast to the first two days [link Day 1] [link Day 2] and our convention "preview" [link], this last posting focuses on the two polar extremes of the convention, and the industry.)

For Chris Nixon [link to bio] and myself, day 3 of the MBA-CREF convention (yesterday, Weds.) was filled with meetings with significant industry players from two distinct groups: special servicing and life insurance companies.

We listened for the answer to one specific question from each group, which for us (and perhaps for you) is “the” question.

• Special servicing: what tips or advice can you give a borrower in 2010?
• Life insurance company: will your loan allocations differ from your 2009 performance? (Read: will we see any “improvement” over 2009?)

Here is our summary of the answers given to us.

Special Servicing Tips

Not surprisingly, the tips were very similar to those articulated at the recent CMSA January Conference [link to 2nd day posting].    However, we heard enough “new” or different answers to craft an expanded list of tips.

True, the answers vary depending upon the particular servicer, the project, the carveout sponsor, the tenants, etc.

But putting it all together, here are the tips:

Do This:

• be nice
• send all information in; be open and transparent
• sign a pre-negotiations agreement
• keep paying cash flow
• have a reasonable, cogent plan BEFORE you contact the lender or servicer (show us that you are in a good city\market, with good tenants, good DSC, etc.) 
• show up with $ (to right size the loan) when you ask for a debt restructure
• default with dignity (i.e., have a "real" default and then be truthful)

Do NOT Do This:

• tell lender or servicer that you're "partners"
• show up with a sham balance sheet
• stiff or abuse your other lenders and the expect us to expect otherwise
• tell lender or servicer that you're a good borrower
• "fish" for information or for terms of a plan that will be acceptable
• cry
• hold lender or servicer hostage
• ask for any of the cash flow (nor a cash flow mortgage)
• fly in on a private jet
• offer a bribe
• rob Peter to pay Paul
• launch off on a religious sermon (caveat: "the special servicer knows that it is going to Hell – every day is Hell")
• ask for any return on the new equity infusion made in borrower 

(For our other postings on CMBS special servicing, use the “search” function on the right side – and search terms such as “special servicing.’)

Life Company Loan Allocations for 2010 (& comparison to 2009)

The message generally was consistent from all our life insurance company contacts:

• in 2009, roughly 30%-45% of the allocation was utilized to refinance the “best” loans\relationships in the portfolio
• in 2009, not all of the allocation was utilized . . .
• but since corporate spread have dramatically dropped in the last 6 months, mortgages are a relative good investment; so . . . 
• there is hope that the mortgage allocation will be fully funded in 2010 . . .
• however, probably the same percentage of the allocation (30%-45%) will be utilized to refinance the “best” loans\relationships in the portfolio . . .
• and, the allocation amount is not near the level seen during recent years
• the limited funds available for new loans will target the narrow bandwidth of the best projects and sponsors (high Debt Service Coverage or DSC; good Loan to Value or LTV; good balance sheet of the sponsor; good tenants; good market position; etc.)
• since large loans to single-sponsor borrowers (and not multiple loans to different sponsors) typically fit this narrow bandwidth, 2010 could be the year of the large loan for many life insurance companies

Add all of this up, and it is clear that with a muted allocation amount and the commitment to utilize a significant part of it to refinance the current portfolio, the total amount of credit available for 2010 from life companies is small (relative to demand). 

The story here reminds me of the message from the CMSA January Conference: the recent CMBS issuances are good news for Wall Street but “no” news (i.e., no help) for Main Street.

The same should be said of the Life Insurance Company mortgage loan allocations: it sounds good, but really?

So, the message from both the CMBS Conference and the MBA-CREF Convention sync very nicely. (As predicted in my earlier posting?) [link]

If the mantra during the ‘90s and ‘00s was “other people’s money” (or “commercial subprime”), the mantra for the new economy is “show me the hard equity” (or “real money for real people”).

Yes, we’re returning to real estate fundamentals.

And since a large percentage of CRE is over-leveraged (a condition that I call "subprime commercial"), we circle back to the tips on special servicing . . .

If you see it differently, or have something to add, please post a comment below.

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As noted in my lengthy postings summarizing the recent 2010 CMSA January Conference in DC [Day 1 link; Day 2 link], over 1,000 commercial real estate professionals attended the conference – roughly 2X more than expected.

Why this unexpected attendance? Answer: All of us are looking for answers amidst the continuing liquidity problems in the CRE Capital Markets. This topic was the sole focus at this conference.  (And it even shows in the number of people "visiting" TTL blog since the Tuesday [Day 1] posting: we show over 1,000 total "hits", of which over 550 are "unique", as of this blog posting.)

 I've received feedback asking for a summary covering a specified set of topics from the two (much, much longer) blogs covering days 1 and 2.  (Keep that feedback coming!)

So, here is that subset of information from the 2010 CMSA January Conference:

INVESTORS FORUM

This forum is for a broad band of CRE debt investors (such as B note holders, mezzanine lenders).

The meeting time was devoted to a survey of the 250+ people in the room. Here are some of the responses: 

• 45% of the voters believe that CRE values will continue to fall in 2010 with no recovery in CRE values until 2011 (this fall is in addition to the 44% fall from 2007 CRE pricing)
• with respect to the 2005-2008 CMBS pools, 37% of the voters believe that the average losses will be in the 11%-15% range (these loses will wipe out bond holder through the "AJ" class)
• 43% of the voters believe that for CMBS loans liquidated in 2010, the average loss severity will be 40%-50% (and 27% believe that the average loss severity will be 50%-60%)
• 69% of the voters believe that annual new CMBS issuances will not exceed $100B until 2013
• for new CMBS issuances in 2010: 50% of the voters believe that issuances will be single borrower transactions; and 33% of the voters believe that issuances will be multi-borrower and large loan structures (with only a few assets); and
• 58% of the voters believe that "old-school" multi-borrower, fixed rate deals will return no sooner than 2012 (or later)

REAL ESTATE FUNDAMENTALS: "THE FACTS OF LIFE"

If the focus on "CMBS 2.0" (which is the "hot" phrase used to describe the "new" CMBS model and market) is a bit too out of touch for me, this session just hammered on the current picture of the CRE market:

• unemployment at historical highs (and still rising)
• retail sales still stumbling
• consumer confidence falling
• "asking" commercial rents falling
• commercial leasing activity (absorption) falling
• CRE sales activity: stagnant
• CRE values -43% from the high in 2007
• huge amount of CRE loan maturities over the next three years, with inadequate sources of credit to pay-off those maturities
• huge shortfall in CRE equity (such that it will not fill gap between the credit available and the looming CRE maturities)
• over 75 funds have been formed to buy distressed CRE debt and properties; but little it has been deployed
• very little CRE has been "re-priced" or "re-set" by lenders or servicers foreclosing or disposing of assets
• we're still early in the CRE recover (perhaps only 25% into the process!) (One interesting comment: remember that valuation adjustment occurs early in the CRE recovery process; so we might be 75%-90% into the valuation adjustment process.)
• importantly: no one on the panel, nor else where in the room, foresees an implementation by the Government of an "RTC style" approach (where the Federal government quickly closes large numbers of banks and thrifts, and then quickly sells the loans and assets at steep discounts – resulting in a "harsh pain" but quick re-pricing of CRE
• unlike the late 80s & early 90s: this time there is no new industry (such at technology) to lead the recovery by increasing employment

BORROWER PANEL: "SURVIVOR"

This panel focused on "how" a borrower could make it through until CRE liquidity returns.

The panel has some advice for borrowers:

• show up with $ if you want to restructure your debt
• if you're in a good city, with good tenants and with DSC (get it?
• Use $ to right-size the loan), then you'll probably survive

It was interesting that while reference was made to splitting up a CMBS loan into an A Note (with good DSC & LTV) and a B Note (representing the "bad" part of the original loan), no one gave any details on the structure (such as the terms of the B Note, the proceeds waterfall between the lender [under the B Note] and the "new" equity [that injected capital needed, in part, to right-size the Note A], the rate of return on the new equity, etc.)

SURVEILLANCE & WORKOUTS: "LET'S MAKE A DEAL'

This panel didn't give any real guidance on terms of workouts, other than to list some basic rules of the game:

Do This:

• be nice
• send all information in; be open and transparent
• sign a pre-negotiations agreement
• keep paying cash flow
• have a reasonable, cogent plan BEFORE you contact the lender or servicer

Do NOT Do This:

• tell lender or servicer that you're "partners"
• tell lender or servicer that you're a good borrower
• "fish" for information or for terms of a plan that will be acceptable
• cry
• hold lender or servicer hostage
• ask for any of the cash flow (nor a cash flow mortgage)
• fly in on a private jet
• offer a bribe
• rob Peter to pay Paul
• launch off on a religious sermon (caveat: "the special servicer knows that it is going to Hell – every day is Hell")
• ask for any return on the new equity infusion made in borrower

It was an interesting day. Much like our experience in Munich – very little clapping at the end of any session (yes, it reminded me a little of the sessions at the EU conference that we attended in October 2008) [link]

In a future posting, I'll cover comments made to us by several elected and appointed Federal officials.

If you have any questions, comments or observations, please post them below.

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(When we attend industry conferences, we bring you along by blogging on topics of interest to us, with our comments as a bonus. This is the second in a series of posting relating to, and from, the 2010 CMSA January Conference. [Link to Day 1] Our blogs on other conferences are found [i] under the "Market Trends" category in the archives on the right side of the page, or [ii] by a word or phrase search on the right side of the page [suggested search terms: looking glass; scorecard; pond].)

Technology Tip: darn, this American Airlines flight does NOT have GoGo Inflight Wi-Fi. I hate this. So, I'm forced to type this in Word, and then post it tomorrow morning from home. 

However, here's a tip on "how" I organize all of my passwords and PINs, including my password for GoGo:

- create a separate Contact card in Outlook for each website, frequent flyer\use membership, etc.; include the applicable website on the card

- be sure to password "protect" your phone\PDA (tip: use a password combination that you can enter with one hand, so that you can leave your other hand free)

Now, on to Day 2 . . .

Day 2 is the last day of the conference. It has a different feel than day one, in part because the crowd is significantly larger.

I've been told that when the CMSA planned this 2010 event, they anticipated @ 500 people would register for the conference. Whether is was the pain of an uneventful 2009 (read: no CRE money for no one), or simply wanting to be told that 2010 would be better (read: CRE money for someone . . . please), today it felt like every one of the registered 1,000 attendees crowded into the basement ballroom floor of the JW Marriott Hotel.

Yes, we're literally all "in this cramped CRE space together."

Today the program focused on different points of the CRE space, with appearances and comments by two members of the US House and by the Chairman of the FDIC. This posting will summarize the substantive items.

The comments by the elected and appointed officials will be included in a post later this week (or this weekend - I have to get caught up at "real" work).

Here are the highlights (with some commentary, of course) from the last session on Day 1 and several Sessions from Day 2.

LESSONS FROM CMBS 1.0: "THE WONDER YEARS"

Frankly, calling the "old" CMBS market\model "1.0" and then labeling the soon-to-come, "rejuvenated" CMBS market\model "2.0" strikes me as being very, very hopeful. From my perspective, CMBS 2.0 better be strikingly different and improved over CMBS 1.0. (Indeed, why are we so married to the CMBS model? As an Air Force brat, it strikes me as if we're focusing on making the bi-plane better.) And CMBS 2.0 better arrive quickly and with billions of Dollars. (Warning: 2.0 is no "CMBSuperman.")

Time will tell, of course.

But if the comments at this conference are correct:

• CMBS 2.0 will not arrive quickly
• 2.0 will not be the "proceeds party" that characterized CMBS 1.0, and
• 2.0 will not come close to bringing the liquidity needed to refi the huge amount of near-term loan maturities.

One panelist gave a very good description of the collateral damage to the CRE finance market caused by pushing CMBS 1.0 to the limits:

• Wall Street's intervention (or commodization) of CRE finance brought an incredible amount of liquidity to CRE
• Utilizing the CDO structure in the CRE space was a logical, yet terribly short-sighted mistake in that it effectively separated (or "de-linked" the unique credit risk inherent in CRE from the investment decision
• The liquidity party quickly spread across the CRE finance spectrum
• Wall Street underwriting, downward rate pressure, increase in proceeds and complicated credit "stack" structures quickly captured a significant share of credit extended to improved CRE, and in doing so, forced regional and community banks to change the focus of their CRE lending away from income producing CRE and into construction loans, builder lines of credit, land development loans and raw land loans.
• CMBS 1.0 was characterized by: (1) no future exposure by the loan originator and too many loan originators placed loans with other people's money (Comment: I call this the "merchant lender" mentality – 'if you lend it, someone will buy it'); (2) it did NOT adequately address the current "shut down" scenario (for example, the investment grade investor is given too little "control").
• Some of the lessons learned from CMBS 1.0, and perhaps early characteristics of CMBS 2.0:
  • the B-piece needs to be larger (for meaningful "skin in the game") or even structured out of the deal by having a mezzanine strips in place of a B-piece (the Inland Retail deal is an example of this);
  • the special servicer needs to be independent, or some other mechanism put in place to give the investment grade investor some assurance of impartiality by the special servicer, or the ability to have meaningful input on special servicer decisions;
  • limit the number of investment classes (for example, the DDR, Flagler & Inland Retail issuances in late '09 only have a handful of bond holder classes);
  • single purpose entity (SPE) changes in response to the GGP case; and
  • FINALLY, someone mentioned covered bonds [link to prior posting on covered bonds] – I find it very, very interesting that this comment was quickly brushed aside, as if the covered bond product was irrelevant. (So, if it is irrelevant, then "why" did a former President of the CMSA testify on the Hill in support of the product? Is the CMSA simply focusing on the near term revival of the CMBS market?  What about a long-term fix or better model?)

REAL ESTATE FUNDAMENTALS: "THE FACTS OF LIFE"

If the focus on 2.0 is a bit too out of touch for me, this session just hammered on the current picture of the CRE market:

• unemployment at historical highs (and still rising)
• retail sales still stumbling
• consumer confidence falling
• "asking" commercial rents falling
• commercial leasing activity (absorption) falling
• CRE sales activity: stagnant
• CRE values -43% from the high in 2007
• huge amount of CRE loan maturities over the next three years, with inadequate sources of credit to pay-off those maturities
• huge shortfall in CRE equity (such that it will not fill gap between the credit available and the looming CRE maturities)
• over 75 funds have been formed to buy distressed CRE debt and properties; but little it has been deployed
• very little CRE has been "re-priced" or "re-set" by lenders or servicers foreclosing or disposing of assets
• we're still early in the CRE recover (perhaps only 25% into the process!) (One interesting comment: remember that valuation adjustment occurs early in the CRE recovery process; so we might be 75%-90% into the valuation adjustment process.)
• importantly: no one on the panel, nor else where in the room, foresees an implementation by the Government of an "RTC style" approach (where the Federal government quickly closes large numbers of banks and thrifts, and then quickly sells the loans and assets at steep discounts – resulting in a "harsh pain" but quick re-pricing of CRE
• unlike the late 80s & early 90s: this time there is no new industry (such at technology) to lead the recovery by increasing employment

The audience was very quiet during this session.

BORROWER PANEL: "SURVIVOR"

This panel focused on "how" a borrower could make it through until CRE liquidity returns.

The panel has some advice for borrowers:

• show up with $ if you want to restructure your debt
• if you're in a good city, with good tenants and with DSC (get it?
• Use $ to right-size the loan), then you'll probably survive

It was interesting that while reference was made to splitting up a CMBS loan into an A Note (with good DSC & LTV) and a B Note (representing the "bad" part of the original loan), no one gave any details on the structure (such as the terms of the B Note, the proceeds waterfall between the lender [under the B Note] and the "new" equity [that injected capital needed, in part, to right-size the Note A], the rate of return on the new equity, etc.)

SURVEILLANCE & WORKOUTS: "LET'S MAKE A DEAL'

This panel didn't give any real guidance on terms of workouts, other than to list some basic rules of the game:

Do This:

• be nice
• send all information in; be open and transparent
• sign a pre-negotiations agreement
• keep paying cash flow
• have a reasonable, cogent plan BEFORE you contact the lender or servicer

Do NOT Do This:

• tell lender or servicer that you're "partners"
• tell lender or servicer that you're a good borrower
• "fish" for information or for terms of a plan that will be acceptable
• cry
• hold lender or servicer hostage
• ask for any of the cash flow (nor a cash flow mortgage)
• fly in on a private jet
• offer a bribe
• rob Peter to pay Paul
• launch off on a religious sermon (caveat: "the special servicer knows that it is going to Hell – every day is Hell")
• ask for any return on the new equity infusion made in borrower

It was an interesting day. Much like our experience in Munich – very little clapping at the end of any session (yes, it reminded me a little of the sessions at the EU conference that we attended in October 2008) [link]

In a future posting, I'll cover comments made to us by several elected and appointed Federal officials.

If you have any questions or comments, please post your comment below.

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Sick and beyond tired of the inflexibility of CMBS servicers in making needed modifications to CMBS loans that we all know are in the ditch?  Help might be here:

On September 15, 2009, the IRS and the Department of the Treasury issued three pieces of guidance relating to commercial mortgage loans held by a securitization vehicle (a CMBS loan).

• The final rules (see PDF entitled "TD 9463") regarding "Modifications of Commercial Mortgage Loans Held by a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC)" include changes in collateral, guarantees, credit enhancement of an obligation and changes to the recourse nature of an obligation.  These rules expand the list of exceptions that will not be considered "significant modifications" of a CMBS loan obligation held by a REMIC.
  
• The IRS also issued Revenue Procedure 2009-45 (PDF), which is a final ruling that describes the conditions under which modifications to certain mortgage loans will not cause the IRS to challenge the tax status of REMICs.  Specifically, note the factor that allows a servicer to take action more than one year prior to maturity.  Furthermore, a servicer is able to rely on information provided by the borrower unless it has knowledge to the contrary.  More importantly, while past performance of the loan is a factor in assessing risk, a "significant risk of default" (based upon a "reasonable" belief standard) can be found by the holder or servicer even if the loan is currently performing (This is great news for principals who are keeping the loan payments current from sources other than rent).
  
• In addition, the IRS and Treasury issued Notice 2009-79 (PDF) and are requesting comments on what additional guidance, if any, is needed regarding modifications of commercial mortgage loans held by investment trusts.

Additional information can be found on the CMSA's Web site (link to REMIC Reform).

Hopefully, these guidelines will allow CMBS loan servicers and borrowers greater flexibility to assess risk and allow for appropriate modifications to CMBS loans.  It is desperately needed.

We know that the public is in no mood to support a "rescue" plan for commercial real estate.  Maybe,  just maybe, "tweaking" the tax code like this will be the approach that will be taken by the government—sort of a "back door" rescue plan for commercial real estate.  However, I believe that it'll take much, much more than tweaks like this one to help commercial real estate to QUICKLY recover.

Kudos to the broad cross section of the commercial real estate industry that worked on this initiative (Mortgage Bankers Association, Commercial Mortgage Securities Association, ICSC, Real Estate Roundtable, and others).

If you have any questions or other information, please post a comment.

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Yesterday (Thursday) was the second, and my last, day of the conference.  As I did with the first day of the conference, I summarize some of the sessions.  So, here's the executive summary:

From a session on bankruptcy issues:

• as reported by the Commercial Mortgage Securities Ass'n in its press release, the bankruptcy court in the General Growth Property bankruptcy issued a good ruling on Wednesday.  The ruling recognized the integrity of the special purpose vehicle (or single purpose entity; also called "SPE") utilized by GGP in the ownership of each mall in its portfolio. (Recall that many GPP malls are owned by a SPE subsidiary of GGP.)
• for detail on the importance of the SPE structure to the commercial mortgage lending industry, and for an understanding of the structure itself, take a look at the brief filed by the CMSA in the case.
• briefly, the debtor-in-possession financing recognized the validity of the SPE structure: it did NOT place a lien on each mall (which are owned by separate SPEs) and the first-lien holders of each SPE-owned mall were given a first-priority lien on the cash collateral from their mall collateral
• next step of interest in the case: the hearing on the bad faith filing issues.  Was it proper for the solvent SPE to be included in the bankruptcy of the parent GGP?

From a session on the challenges in complex transaction structures:

• one of the first tasks in handling a distressed loan is identifying the parties and their issues.  For example: (1) who\what are the creditor & borrower issues? (2) who\what are the co-lender issues? (3) and if there is a separate servicer, what are the terms of the servicing agreement? The answers: find the documents.  Read the documents.
• the many, varied structures of the credit stack present challenges simply in understanding the relationships between all of these parties.  Here is a short list of common structures: 1st lien & mezzanine debt (with one or more mezz debt positions; and each mezz debt could have all of the following structures); A note and B note (and the A note might be securitized); A1, A2 and A3 note (and the A1 note might be securitized); "true" participations of any of these notes (if not securitized); etc. Some of these credit stack structures will give you a head ache.  And often the borrower has NO knowledge of them - although a sophisticated borrower might recognize some of the clues pointing to a complicated credit stack.
• for credit stacks that include securitized debt, the rating agency faces multiple challenges: (1) post-closing surveillance (in that it often does not have access to loan documents covering discrete loans in the credit stack); (2) issuing confirmation letters ("no down-grade letters") can be problematic for the same reason; (3) intercreditor agreements and loan documents might not comply with rating agency requirements
• special servicers in securitized loan pools are being changed by the controlling class holders and the B note holders.  This can result in two different special servicers: one appointed by the controlling class holders for the entire pool; and a second by the B note holder as to the notes that it has first-risk loss.  Another complication, of course, is that the special servicer must be approved by the applicable rating agency.  And to further complicate it all, often the intercreditor agreement(s) have a higher rating standard than the standard required by the rating agency monitoring the pool.
• some of the credit stacks are so complicated, that it is difficult for the servicer to determine "who" should receive notice of a change in servicing (or "who" should receive any other notice).  One answer is to follow the money: if the master servicer is the paying agent for the pool, the servicer's treasury group has contact information.
• against this complicated back drop, borrower's often communicate to the incorrect lender! And have difficulty in indentifying "who is who" among this confusing group of players.
• in a prior posting, we commented on the question of whether a borrower should intentionally default a loan that has been put in a securitized pool.  The panel noted these dire consequences for a borrower in special servicing: (1) default interest will accrue; (2) late fees will accrue; and (3) workout land is NOT "borrower friendly" - and if borrower does not obtain its desired result, there is no "free pass" back to the safety of master servicing.
• for loans with "springing" lock box features: borrowers are refusing to do the paper work to create lock boxes.  This results in a covenant default under the loan, which triggers a transfer of the loan to special servicing.  Also, on several loans, local banks (who have long-standing relationships to the principal behind the borrower) have closed dormant, "springing" lock box deposit account - which is a real problem when the lockbox "comes to life" and the master servicer attempts to implement the lockbox structure.

From a session on loan surveillance:

• each point of the mortgage compass is requiring more and better information: bond holders, rating agencies, federal and state regulators, investment committees, etc.
• loans are being reviewed more often (even monthly)
• all of this is a major difference from the late '80s & early '90s
• what are some of the warning signs of a loan going "bad"? (1) exhausting a debt service reserve (recall: this type of reserve was used when a project was not stabilized); (2) exhausting a contingency line item (in a construction loan); (3) change in ownership of any portion of the credit stack (this is often difficult to monitor); (4) low utilization\occupancy of space by tenants; and (5) ___________
• surveillance needs to have a "forward" looking component, such as: (1) future lease rollover; (2) local market information and trends (new construction of competing projects; tenants looking for space; etc.); (3) sponsor level debt information (amount; maturities; etc.); (4) free rent and rental rate trends in the market; and (5) _________
• use "free" resources available on-line
• one problem for servicers: each lender seems to have their own, unique reporting form
• one lesson in this "new" economy: real estate really is unique.  Thus, people need to understand and evaluate each tenant, project, market and principal.
• one panelist briefly mentioned the all-important "mortgage experience adjustment factor" - which is a risk-based capital concept governing insurance companies who hold commercial mortgage debt.  Some time in the near future we'll blog on that mind-boggling concept - and the draconian effect that it has upon insurance companies and their mortgage portfolios.  It is horrible.

This is my last posting on the conference.  It met my expectations.  Everyone agreed: it was the "best" servicing conference in years - undoubtedly because this is the worse real estate market in years.

Today it is back to the office, and the nitty-gritty of workout world.

Please post your comments, suggestions or questions below.

P.S.: back to the restaurant review thing - although there are "cooler" places to go in New Orleans, if you stay at the Hilton Riverside (the conference hotel), then you're immediately adjacent to the Riverwalk Marketplace mall.  The Crazy Lobster (504.569.3380) is a free-standing bar and restaurant on the Riverwalk.  It is a good place to catch a breeze and a change of pace.  Like many places in NO, it has live entertainment in the evenings.  We escaped the conference for several lunches at the Crazy Lobster.  It is a short (100 yards?) walk from the Hilton.  (And yes, it is a GPP mall - and probably owned by an SPE.) (See discussion above on GPP and SPEs.)

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The first day of the 2009 MBA's Commercial/Multifamily Servicing and Technology conference has ended.

It has been a long day, filled with attending panel presentations and meetings with people over meals, in the halls and at receptions.  It started at a 7:30 breakfast and ended @ 10p (when I refused to join a group that headed toward B___n Street).

Attendance this year seems down by @ 40%-50% from prior years.  Indeed, several companies told me that they would not be attending this year.  And many companies seem to have sent only 1 or 2 people this year; instead of the usual 4 or 5.

It is late, and if I don't get this down-load out soon, tomorrow will hit with more panel presentations and meetings - and I'll "lose" these data points.  They are in the order collected by me during the day - and so they are NOT ordered by relative importance.  Here is the down-load  (remember, this is a blog and not a thesis or brief; and it is very late).

(One other preliminary and important thought: if your boss requires that you prepare a memo on the conference, consider this permission to cut'n paste as you wish . .  . . )

From the opening general session:

• during the next 2-3 years, the commercial mortgage finance industry will focus on servicing & asset management, which will be the new front line for the industry
• unemployment remains a key leading indicator of the performance of real estate as an asset class (and since unemployment is expected to increase, it will take several years for the asset class to recover)
• while defaults presently are @ 3%, some predict that the default rate will increase to 6%; consequently, special servicing will become busier, and the need for greater transparency will be increased (in order to support better decision making) (Note the Fitch report described below.)
• one speaker articulated five areas of focus for the industry: (1) greater transparency (with "real time" property performance data); (2) the need for high quality and detailed physical asset condition inspections; (3) greater focus on customized business plans for each asset, which points to the need for more expertise by special servicing; (4) the increase in defaults will strain human resources at companies (and require greater recruiting, more training and better integration); and (5) companies must be better at understanding macro trends and changes

From a session on developments in Washington, DC:

• expect more changes and experimentation by policy makers
• accounting issues include: (1) FASB 140 (true sale changes); (2) FIN 46(r) (balance sheet consolidation with the "primary beneficiary" of securitization vehicles); and (3) FASB 157 (fair value); all due to "FASB's perceived suspicion" of real estate structures
• REMIC reform will take a back seat to other issues at Treasury
• Single Purpose Vehicle (or single purpose entities) and separateness covenants: the General Growth Properties bankruptcy will be an initial stress test of this "bankruptcy remote" structure; although one panelist labeled the GPP structure as "SPE light with bad cash management."  Another panelist called the GPP case simply "bad facts, which should not be followed by other situations."  (This last point puzzles me: a clever borrower might view the GPP case not as "bad facts" but as a "helpful road map.")
• One panelist expects to see a new securitization in 3rd or 4th Q of 2009.  Wow.  Given all of the accounting and structure "issues" detailed during the day, anticipated increase in the default rate, etc. - a securitization in 2009 would be . . . well  . . . wow.
• Federal limits on executive compensation are a huge problem for investors; and are chilling the market by impeding companies from participating in Federal programs
• Terrorism insurance needs to be addressed . . . but the Executive Branch needs to cut programs - not increase the funding of them.
• Welcome to the "Age of Regulation"

From a panel session on dealing with troubled securitized loans:

• even life companies are starting to see their mortgage portfolios in distress (so they are focusing in-ward on their portfolios; and not outward to refinance CMBS loans)
• the demand for new commercial mortgages exceeds the supply
• long term, fixed rate interest mortgages are limited in amount
• property values are difficult to establish
• debt service coverage & loan-to-value criteria are very conservative (and thus underwriting is tough)
• CMBS structures do not offer refinancing (with only a limited ability to extend)

From a panel session on today's servicing challenges:

• servicers are surprised that subordinate lenders do not understand their rights (relative to the rights of the first-lien secured lender)
• communication among the lenders in the credit stack can be "challenging" (Wow; that was an understatement.  I've seen some deals where the disparate balance sheets and agendas of the lenders present the biggest hurdle to resolving a distressed project.  The project and the borrower can almost be an afterthought)
• valuation is a huge problem: every party at every point of the debt stack and the equity stack needs a good\reliable value in order to make decisions.  No value=No decisions=No peace
• as reported by Fitch Ratings in an April 29, 2009 special report, CMBS special servicing volume increased by more than 5.0X in the 15 months ending March 31, 2009 (from $4.6B at 12/31/07 to $23.7B at 3/31/09).  And these figures do not address distressed bank debt, nor distressed life insurance company debt.  More wow.

Taken together, I come away from the day with much the same impression as I did on that day three session at the EU conference last fall: no one is clapping.

Time to go to bed.

If you have your own comments, or follow up questions, please post a comment below.

P.S.:  Returning to the eating theme from my posting on Tuesday, and before I get some sleep -  here's another good restaurant in New Orleans: Herbsaint Bar and Restaurant.  This is the second restaurant recommended to me by a New Orleans native.  I now understand.  It is very, very good.  Not as fancy as Nola; much more stylish than Jacques-Imo's. And not in the French Quarter. Together, all three restaurants will pull me back to New Orleans.

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Over the last 8 months, we've blogged in October from the EU, where we attended a real estate convention and visited with several clients (link to last day), and then in February from the MBA-CREF convention in San Diego (link to last day),

This week, we're attending the MBA's Servicing & Technology Conference in New Orleans.  This will be my 9th or 10th time at this conference.  In the past, the focus at each conference has been the nuts'n bolts of master servicing (i.e., servicing performing loans after loan origination) and the growing use of technology as the servicing backbone.  Bread and butter stuff, with a growing awareness that technology could make significant improvements to the production and servicing model.

Each year at this conference, the special servicing "naysayers" (i.e., those handling the servicing of distressed loans) darkly predicted that the loan production party was about to end - that the workouts surely were about to start.  Surely.  Sometime.  Simply a matter of time . . . .

Well, it has ended, and the conference this week has a heavy focus on distressed debt.  Broadly stated, here is a quick, high-level summary of the topics to be covered at the conference:

• Loan workouts and restructures
• Default management and delinquencies
• Risk mitigation
• Insurance issues
• Bankruptcy & receivership
• Accounting & tax issues (including REMIC issues & implications)
• Servicing issues in a changing environment
• Transparency issues
• Issues in foreclosure

As it turns out, this conference completes a trifecta for us - this is the last of  three meetings which, when taken together, would be fertile material for Shakespeare:

• Act One: The Global Hurricane Hits (our EU experience)
• Act Two: Loan Production in the Big Ditch (our MBA-CREF experience)
• Act Three: Special Servicers to the Rescue (this week in New Orleans)

Stay tuned.  I'll be posting from the conference.  And I suspect that we'll be collecting materials for many more postings after this week.

P.S.: OK, so I snuck into town several days before the conference - simply to eat and sleep.  Top restaurants so far - on two extremes:

• Jacques-Imo's: full of locals for a funky, affordable creole & cajun food (eat with the locals); 30 minute ride on the St. Charles Street car from downtown (more fun)
• Nola: great food but expensive (relative to Jacques-Imos); white table cloth

If you have any questions or comments for us to investigate while we're at the conference, please post a comment.

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