CRE Workouts: Early Signs Of Banks Implementing the 'Good' Note A and 'Bad' Note B Approach?

Previously, we commented on the October 30, 2009 regulatory announcement by Federal regulators, which articulated a significant switch or approach in the handling of distressed commercial mortgage loans. [links to two blog postings, including a copy of the announcement]

One startling portion of the announcement is that banks are encouraged, in the appropriate circumstances, to split the distressed note into two notes: a performing Note A; and a non-performing Note B.

The bottom line question is this: so what? Is this approach being implemented at banks and then approved by the regulators?

I’m having a “conflicted” experience on this question:

  • On Wednesday, April 28, I attended the spring meeting of the Real Estate Finance & Investment Council of the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin. One speaker gave this answer: “my company is seeing thousands of these Note A\Note B loan restructures, all based upon the October 30 announcement.”
  • This falls in line with a statement (heard by me) by the Chair of the FDIC at a conference earlier this year: “we’re bringing in our examiners and telling them to support Note A\Note B structures in commercial mortgage loan workouts”
  • Wow; this is not my experience. I’m seeing ZERO regional and community banks implementing this Note A\Note B structure in workouts – despite the October 30 announcement and the statement by the FDIC Chair.  In contrast to all of that, I have attended conferences and lunches where bankers literally confront local regulators about their refusal to implement Note A\Note B structures. Yes, those conversations have been “uncomfortable.”

After the speaker left the stage, I asked him (out of earshot of others – he’s a friend and well-respected by others): “Who is doing the Note A\Note B workout? Are you out of your mind?”

He named a top 5 bank, and commented that his company recently worked on 3 workouts involving this structure.

He agreed with me: so far, his company has NOT seen the structure at the regional or community bank level.

However, his comment points to this:

  • with the big banks starting to implement the A\B note structure, in time the approach will trickle down to all banks
  • this is a good thing: the A\B approach will unlock the debt stack, and will be the key to allow the market to find solutions to injecting new capital

QUESTIONS: what are you seeing on this topic? Do you agree with my thoughts?

Please post your comment or question below.

 

Regulators Issue Major Regulatory Announcement: A Prudent Peace Pipe?

This past Friday (October 31, 2009), the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (website) released a major policy statement giving guidance, and articulating general principals, for the distressed commercial real estate debt market.

The report is a "must" read: PDF.  (Footnote #1 to the report lists the Federal & State Regulators - visit the FFIEC website for the complete list.)

The introductory paragraphs and the Article I "Purpose" statement contain some very, very interesting (even bold) statements:

  • " . . . financial institutions and borrowers may find it mutually beneficial to work constructively together"
  • "The regulators have found that prudent CRE loan workouts are often in the best interest of the financial institution and the borrower."
  • "Financial institutions that implement prudent loan workout arrangements after performing comprehensive reviews of borrowers’ financial conditions will not be subject to criticism for engaging in these efforts even if the restructured loans have weaknesses that result in adverse credit classifications."
  • " In addition, renewed or restructured loans to borrowers who have the ability to repay their debts according to reasonable modified terms will not be subject to adverse classification solely because the value of the underlying collateral has declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance (emphasis added)."

This is a must read for everyone involved in CRE.

This is very different from the regulatory guillotine used in the late 80s & early 90s.

And the policy statement should have major implications - and undoubtedly will influence regulatory bodies such as the NAIC (which loosely governs commercial mortgage investments by life insurance companies) (website) and other "unregulated" financial institutions.

Please post your comments.