U.S. Treasury Department Issues Guidance on Modification of Commercial Mortgages Held By Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs): Will the Floodgates Open?

In September, Keith Mullen posted a blog entry attaching the IRS and Treasury Department's announcement clarifying and expanding the "significant modification" REMIC rules.

The first announcement was the IRS guidelines contained in Rev. Proc. 2009-45, which provides guidance for modifications to certain loans without triggering an IRS challenge to the tax status of the REMIC. The guidance changes the standard under which loans may be modified without triggering the prohibited transaction tax on the income of the trust. Prior to Rev. Proc. 2009-45's current announcement, loans could be modified only if a change in the terms of the obligation was "occasioned by default or reasonably foreseeable default." Rev. Proc. 2009-45 changes this standard and permits a change in the terms to be negotiated if, based on all the facts and circumstances and after meeting the threshold for a qualified loan, the holder or Servicer reasonably believes that there is a "significant risk of default" of the loan upon maturity of the loan or at an earlier date, and that the modified loan will present a "substantially reduced risk of default." Rev. Proc. 2009-45 makes a point of stating that there is "no maximum period after which a default is not per se foreseeable." Previously, Special Service practice was not to entertain a modification for impending "maturity defaults" with maturity dates beyond one year, because maturities beyond one year were not, per se, a reasonably foreseeable default. The guidance is clearly intended to allow Servicers to have greater flexibility in considering "all the facts and circumstances in servicing distressed mortgages." Additionally, those facts and circumstances can come from written factual representations made by the borrower as long as the Servicer "neither knows nor has reason to know that such representations are false." Interestingly, these guidelines will apply to loan modifications effected on or after January 1, 2008.

Additionally, the Treasury Department issued final regulations ("TD 9463") specifically expanding the list of exceptions that will not be considered "significant modifications" of mortgage obligations held by the REMIC. TD 9463 became effective September 16, 2009, with an expanded list of exceptions that include modifications that release, substitute, add or otherwise alter, a substantial amount of the collateral so long as the obligation continues to be "principally secured by an interest in real property."

And lastly, the final regulations clarify that "value retesting" for modifications to satisfy the requirement that the loan principally be secured by real property will not be necessary as long as the fair market value of the interest in real property that secures the loan immediately after the modification equals or exceeds the fair market value of the interest in the real property that secured the loan immediately before the modification. This alternative test is consistent with the general rule that a decline in the value of collateral does not cause a mortgage to cease to be principally secured by real property. Finally, the regulation provided that changes in the nature of an obligation from nonrecourse to recourse or from recourse to nonrecourse are permitted so long as the obligation continues to be principally secured by an interest in real property.

Will the floodgates Open?

As many readers know, there has been an ongoing battle between Special Servicers and borrowers regarding the loan modification process. Special Servicers, needing to be certain that their actions were consistent with Pooling and Servicing Agreements, as well as REMIC regulations, were unwilling to take any significant risk that their Servicing actions would be considered a violation of REMIC rules or of the terms and conditions of Pooling and Servicing Agreements to which they were a party.

The new clarifying rules are resulting in a new flood of requests to Special Servicers to consider loan modifications of loans which are not in default but which are not "refinanceable" on their future maturity date (in some cases beyond a year).

Keep in mind that REMIC regulations were one, but not the only impediment to Servicers acting decisively and expeditiously. Other factors include the staffing and expertise levels of the Servicer and Special Servicer, different investment perspectives of the respective parties given their economic position in the transaction, as well as ill-defined or uncertain rights and obligations of Servicers and Bondholders under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement itself.

Much has been written about the impending "maturity default crisis" bubbling up in the last half of 2010. The regulators have done their part in anticipating needed regulatory reform and clarification. Now it is time for the securitized lending industry to step up to the plate and provide the expeditious and cost effective resolution to the maturity default issue.

If indeed the securitized mortgage lending industry is to reconstitute itself, it will need to demonstrate to its customers (i.e., both mortgage loan borrowers and bondholders) that it can efficiently and prudently address these mounting Servicing concerns.

Should a Borrower Intentionally Default on a CMBS Loan?

By Guest Writer – Christopher T. Nixon, Winstead PC

CMBS Master Servicers typically lack the ability to modify a CMBS loan to preemptively address a potential loan problem. A CMBS borrower frustrated with such inability may elect to purposefully default on the loan to circumvent the restrictions placed on the Master Servicer and force the transfer of the loan to the Special Servicer. The borrower's expectation is that the Special Servicer will have the ability and agree to modify the CMBS loan to address the potential loan problem.

Risks:  If it is apparent to the Special Servicer that the borrower intentionally defaulted on the loan, the Special Servicer may elect to accelerate the debt and pursue foreclosure of the real estate collateral. The Special Servicer may determine that an aggressive foreclosure of the defaulted loan will maximize recovery for the bondholders as compared to attempting to negotiate a loan workout with an untrustworthy borrower acting in a manner detrimental to the economic interests of the REMIC Trust in which the CMBS loan is pooled.

Potential Solution:  Rather than taking the inflammatory step of defaulting on the CMBS loan to reach the Special Servicer to address a potential loan problem, a borrower should consider discussing the potential loan problem with the Master Servicer. If the Master Servicer determines that the loan problem constitutes a "reasonably foreseeable default," the Master Servicer may have the ability under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) to transfer the loan to the Special Servicer at that time (without waiting for an actual loan default to occur) to address the loan problem. A Special Servicer may be more inclined to consider a loan modification as compared to a foreclosure if the Master Servicer and borrower present the loan problem to the Special Servicer at this stage. The effectiveness of this approach will largely depend on the quality and sophistication of the Master Servicer and Special Servicer. Given the current bad economy, Master Servicers are increasingly aware of the need to proactively discuss borrower loan problem concerns and to involve the Special Servicer early in such discussions.

Tips for the Borrower:

  • Be honest about the potential loan problem when discussing it with the Master Servicer.
  • Provide sufficient information to the Master Servicer for it to objectively determine that the potential loan problem constitutes a "reasonably foreseeable default."
  • Do not create a potential loan problem merely to seek economic concessions from the Special Servicer. The borrower should have a sincere concern that a loan default is likely to occur if the loan problem is not promptly addressed.
     

Into the Looking Glass (Day Three - part 2): 2009 MBA-CREF - CMBS Special (workout) Servicing Myths? Fact or Fiction

(This is part of a series of postings from the 2009 MBA-CREF convention in San Diego.) (Trends; Arriving;  Day One; Day Two; Day Three)

My time at the convention has been a series of "firsts" for me:

  • "live" blogging on Day Two during the Opening Session talk by Paul Begala of CNN and Tucker Carlson of MSNBC (thereby cementing, and forever embracing, my "inner geekness")
  • after experiencing the credit crisis first hand in the EU last fall (Before; Day 1, Day 2, Day 3, Day 4Last Day), I completed the high-level credit crisis perspective by immersing myself in it here at the MBA-CREF conference - after years of drinking from the "frothy" side of the real estate finance cycle
  • finally, this is the second blog entry for today - the last day of the convention.  I've never done two of these in one day.  (. . . need to find a hobby.)

But don't think that I've saved the "best" for last; because there is a "positive" side to the new economy.  There is opportunity in chaos and change.

However, I am continually approached by people concerned about the inability of CMBS borrowers to locate financing to refinance their CMBS loan.  Notwithstanding efforts by the CMSA and the MBA to educate the industry on this product (such as their brochure explaining CMBS debt), much confusion and misinformation exists about CMBS loans.

So, this last entry will focus on a session here at the convention that addressed the myths of CMBS servicing . . . . "click on" to read on . . . .

BIGGEST MYTHS OF CMBS SERVICING:

  1. The Tsunami is coming (on workouts) and nobody is ready.  The panel said they were ready, and that they were reallocating staff to deal with it.  Note that the head of a large special servicer told us (off-line) that each of his managers could handle 20 workouts at any single time.  Humm. . . that's not my experience from the late '80s and early '90s.  Each workout is a "hands on" process.  As you can tell, I'm a HUGE techie; and my experience is that artificial intelligence is NOT quite there on this topic. Technology is all about fewer people doing more; a workout is all about one person doing less.  Maybe I"m wrong, or simply not a techie.  Or just old. And too old to argue it.
  2. The crisis is just like the one in the late '80s and early '90s.  This one is a partial truth.  Kind of . . . .
  3. Servicers represent the borrower.  Answer: NO. Next . . .
  4. The only way to talk to the special servicer is to stop making payments on the loan.  Answer: NO.  Definitely not.  Stupid move.  Instead, prepare a package that literally re-underwrites the loan (and the project, the principal, etc.), and send it the servicer, with a clear articulation of the approaching or immanent default.  But do NOT stop making payments.  Bad things happen when payments are stopped. Bad things.  (Hint: recourse events . . . .)
  5. At maturity, the loan will be extended.  Answer: NO.  The servicer will re-underwrite the loan.  So, again, help the servicer out by furnishing all of the materials and information that you'd furnish if you were applying for a new loan.  Show the servicer "why" it makes sense to extend, and give sound underwriting justifications. (See #4 above.)
  6. Servicers are only in it for the money. The panel said "no."  Humm . . . just beware of extension fees.  Remember, servicers are not non-profits.  Hopefully the servicer's standard of care to the trust will mitigate raping the principal (on the extension fee) at the expense of the trust.
  7. 25 year old managers are working out $50mill loans.  The panel said "no."  I follow that position at this juncture in the market.  However (see #1 above), the prediction here is that when number of defaults increase, this answer will change.  Let me digress here: the entire supposition of our Tough Times blog is NOT that I need a hobby (although Barb [the patient saint who has stood by me - sometimes laughing - for 29+ years] says I do need a hobby), but that workout experience is NOT plentiful, and that companies need this blog to train their people.  (See my early experience entry.)  In addition, we're continually giving workout seminars for clients.  So, please don't tell me that experience is not, nor will be, a problem. . . . or I'm simply wasting an opportunity to pick up a hobby.
  8. Advancing is good business for master servicers.  NO.  A master servicer is not a bank - and (to my knowledge) none of them have rec'd funds from TARP.
  9. Special servicers are only interested in protecting their investments (since they're "related" to the B-piece buyer).  NO.  Caveat: there is a growing under-current of tranche tension between the investor groups.  This will be interesting to watch.  And potentially harmful to the capital markets niche.
  10. Every appraisal creates an appraisal reduction (called an "ASER" in CMBS lingo).  No.  However, a new appraisal is required when a loan is transferred from master servicing to special servicing.
  11. When one loan transfers into special servicing, then the whole loan portfolio transfers.  No. This is not the RTC where whole portfolios transfer.  This is a one at a time process.
  12. The credit crunch (by itself) means an automatic loan term concessions.  No.  Each loan, property, market and borrower is reviewed.  No "magic bullet" here.  However, we're watching this one, and expect to see some really, really creative litigation.  Yes, we're doing our own research - top prepare for the battle.
  13. CMBS is the same as RMBS.  No.
  14. The only option a special servicer has to resolving a defaulted loan is to foreclose.  No.  Generally, a special servicer can take the same actions as a servicer\holder of a portfolio loan, with several exceptions (exceptions include: purchase options in the PSA; can not take a profits interest; cannot give new money; etc.)
  15. The rating agencies approve all workouts.  Not really; however, they might issue a "no down grade" letter.
  16. You can't get any information on CMBS loans.  No.  There are many web sites that furnish information CMBS loans.
  17. The trustee acts like a policeman in the structure.  No.  It merely has administrative functions.  It has no surveillance role.
  18. The special servicer can not modify loans unless there exists a payment default.  No.  The comment was made that 50% of special serviced loans are NOT in payment default.  See #4 above.
  19. All special servicers own the B-piece and are the controlling class holder.  Generally yes, but not always.

If you have any questions or comments, please post your comment.