Steering Through CMBS Waters: A Primer for Troubled Loans

Article Co-Author:  Courtney D. Bristow, Winstead PC

It’s Monday morning and you’re getting ready for work with the news on the TV in the background. By now, you’re practically immune to the daily dose of doom and gloom that has become business news, particularly with regard to real estate and mortgage-backed securities. So you’re not overly concerned when you hear the anchor say, “Vital signs are dangerously low in the commercial mortgage-backed securities market. We’re suffering from a trifecta of decimated bond prices, weakening mortgage performance and drastically reduced loan originations. The threefold combination has pummeled portfolio values and deprived borrowers of a primary source of commercial real estate financing.”1 As you turn off the television and head out the door, you find solace in the fact that you work for a public healthcare company and not a financial services firm.

Your phone is ringing as you walk into your office. It’s your CFO explaining that a $5 million loan on one of your office buildings in Michigan is maturing in three months. He asks you to help the company’s internal business unit that is desperately searching for new financing while, at the same time, communicating with the commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) loan servicer who manages the loan. Did he just say CMBS? Loan servicer?  Find financing upon maturity?  What do you need to know about the CMBS industry and its participants to navigate through this mortgage mess that just fell into your lap? Click here to read the entire article.

Article published in the September issue of American Corporate Counsel (ACC) Docket, the award-winning journal of the Association of Corporate Counsel.
 

Change: New Federal Foreclosure Law Gives Residential Tenants 90 Days to Vacate

(More from our "Watch for Change" series . . . .)

As you know, the "new" economy is prompting a wide range of new laws and ordinances, all of which present opportunities for the unwary to trip up and mess up in the collection process.

This posting will interest you if any of your collateral involves residential real property.

While this posting is written from a Texas perspective, the concept applies to all statesbecause the new Federal law applies to all states.

Thanks to Vince Marino of Winstead PC for this information, which was published in the Houston Business Journal on July 17, 2009.

If you have any questions or comments, please post them.

New Federal Foreclosure Law Gives Residential Tenants 90 Days to Vacate

In May 2009, President Barack Obama signed a new law called the “Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009,” the provisions of which were part of a much longer 72-page law known as the, “Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009.”
 
One part of this new federal law causes an important change in Texas local law on foreclosures and the rights of a tenant after a foreclosure.
 
Effective immediately (i.e. for foreclosures occurring after May 20, 2009) and relating to certain “federally related mortgage loans” and any loans on dwelling or residential real property, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale is required to provide a bona fide tenant at least 90 days’ notice before the tenant has to vacate. The new law is national in scope so tenants, no matter what state they live in, now have time to adjust their lives.
 
As a general rule, the new law requires any immediate successor-in-interest in property foreclosed upon to assume the property subject to the rights of a bona fide tenant under a bona fide lease until the end of the remaining term of the lease. There are exceptions to this general rule — such as the lease must be in existence as of the date of the notice of foreclosure, for example.
 
If a tenant is in possession of the property foreclosed upon without a lease or with a lease that is “terminable at will,” the purchaser at foreclosure merely has to give the occupant 90 days’ notice to vacate.
 
In all of the above instances, the foreclosing party can still evict a tenant who is not paying rent or is otherwise in default under his lease.
 
In Texas, if a mortgage was executed before the lease was executed, or if the lease was executed before the mortgage, and the lease contained a subordination provision making the lease subordinate and the mortgage superior in right, Texas law recognized that, after a foreclosure, such a tenant under such a lease would be a “tenant at will.”
 
Even with the new federal legislation, it would arguably appear that, under such circumstances, and based on the tenant being a tenant at will, a successful bidder at a Texas foreclosure would not have to honor the lease for the duration of its remaining term, but could instead terminate it with a 90-day notice to vacate.
 
Note that even under Texas law before this new federal legislation, if a home was purchased at a foreclosure sale under a lien superior to the tenant’s lease and the tenant paid rent on time and is not otherwise in default under the tenant’s lease after foreclosure, the purchaser was required to give the tenant at least 30 days written notice to vacate if the purchaser chose not to continue the lease. So, in this instance, the new federal law imposes a longer notice period in Texas.
 
Following a foreclosure, the new law says that if the tenant has no lease, he has to vacate within 90 days after receipt of a notice to vacate (which notice might be able to be given even before the foreclosure), or if there is a lease, a bona fide tenant can stay in possession for the remainder of the term pursuant to such tenant’s lease. But if the lease is “terminable at will” under state law, or if a purchaser from the successful bidder at foreclosure will occupy the property as his primary residence, the tenant must nevertheless vacate — but such tenant is entitled to receive a 90-day notice to vacate.
 
There is a provision in the statute that says nothing in the statute shall affect the requirements for termination of any federal or state-subsidized tenancy or of any state or local law that provides longer time periods or other additional protections for tenants.
 
The new foreclosure provisions only affect tenant-occupied properties that are being foreclosed upon and has no effect on mortgagor-occupied properties.
 
The new legislation represents a big change to the law in Texas. Where we previously had scattered state laws, now we have one national statute. The law sunsets on December 31, 2012.

Understanding the Primary Duties of CMBS Loan Servicers to B-Note Holders Under a Co-Lender Agreement (Part 2 of 2)

Guest Writer - Christopher T. Nixon, Winstead PC

In part 1I covered the relationship between the loan servicer and the B-note holder, and the role of the B-note holder in making decisions about the loan.  This posting addresses a situation where that the B-note holder no longer can participate in decisions, and the replacement of the special servicer.

Is there any circumstance in which the B-note holder no longer has consultation and consent rights?
Yes, in the event of a Control Appraisal Event, the B-note holder typically loses its consultation and consent rights under the co-lender agreement.  A Control Appraisal Event is typically defined as a reduction in the principal balance of the B-note by appraisal deductions or realized losses to below a certain level (typically 25%; although we have seen percentage levels as high as 50%) of its original principal balance.  In this event, the consultation and consent rights are transferred to the A-note holder under a typical co-lender agreement.

Under the co-lender agreement, may the B-note holder replace the master servicer?
Absent a breach by the master servicer under the co-lender agreement, the B-note holder has no right to replace the master servicer.

Under the co-lender agreement, may the B-note holder replace the special servicer?
The B-note holder may replace the special servicer without cause at any time, subject to certain conditions being met with respect to the replacement special servicer.  However, it is important to note that the B-note holder is responsible for certain costs and expenses incurred in connection with such replacement, and such replacement may cause significant delays and disruption in the servicing of the A/B loan.  Under most co-lender agreements, the B-note holder loses the right to replace the special servicer upon the occurrence of a Control Appraisal Event.

Conclusion:
Because the terms and conditions of co-lender agreements are typically heavily negotiated between the A-note holder and the B-note holder, it is essential for a CMBS loan servicer to review and understand the terms and conditions of the co-lender agreement for the particular A/B loan being serviced.  A failure by the loan servicer to comply with the terms and conditions of the co-lender agreement for the particular A/B loan being serviced may expose the loan servicer to liability to the B-note holder in connection with the servicing of the A/B loan.


If you have any questions, commentary or stories to share, please post a comment
 

Understanding the Primary Duties of CMBS Loan Servicers to B-Note Holders Under a Co-Lender Agreement (Part 1 of 2)

Guest Writer - Christopher T. Nixon, Winstead PC

CMBS loan servicers have duties to a myriad of parties in the servicing of a CMBS loan, including the REMIC trust, the bondholders, and the borrower.  With respect to an A/B loan, a CMBS loan servicer also has certain duties to the B-note holder pursuant to the terms of the co-lender agreement between the A-note holder and the B-note holder.  Because co-lender agreements are typically heavily negotiated during the origination of an A/B loan, CMBS loan servicers should carefully review the co-lender agreement for the particular A/B loan being serviced to fully understand its duties thereunder to the B-note holder in connection with servicing the A/B loan.

What is the relationship between the CMBS servicer and the B-note holder?
A CMBS loan servicer's relationship with the B-note holder derives from the co-lender agreement between the A-note holder and the B-note holder. The co-lender agreement governs the relationship, and sets forth the duties, liabilities and rights of the A-note holder and the B-note holder with respect to the A/B loan.  A typical co-lender agreement provides that the A-note holder will service the A/B loan on behalf of both the A-note holder and the B-note holder.  When the A-note holder places the A/B loan into a CMBS loan pool pursuant to a typical pooling and servicing agreement, the CMBS loan servicer assumes the A-note holder's obligation to service the A/B loan.

What rights does the co-lender agreement provide to the B-note holder in connection with the servicing of the A/B loan?
The co-lender agreement provides to the B-note holder consultation and consent rights with respect to certain major servicing decisions related to the A/B loan.  The B-note holder's consultation right requires the loan servicer to obtain and consider the advice and suggestions of the B-note holder before taking certain actions related to the A/B loan.  The B-note holder's consent right requires the loan servicer to obtain the consent of the B-note holder before taking certain actions related to the A/B loan.

What major decisions require the servicer to consult with the B-note holder?
The provision of the co-lender agreement defining the B-note holder's consultation rights is typically heavily negotiated between the A-note holder and the B-note holder.  Thus, a loan servicer should pay particular attention to this provision of the co-lender agreement to fully understand the scope of the B-note holder’s consultation rights.  Some loan servicing decisions typically requiring B-note holder consultation are:

  • Proposals to workout the A/B loan upon a borrower default
  • Releases of A/B loan escrow funds
  • Lease renewals requiring lender consent
  • Mortgaged property alterations requiring lender consent

What major decisions require the servicer to obtain the consent of the B-note holder?
Like the provision defining the B-note holder’s consultation rights, the provision of the co-lender agreement defining the B-note holder's consent rights is typically heavily negotiated between the A-note holder and the B-note holder.  A loan servicer should carefully review this provision of the co-lender agreement given that there is no standard list of major decisions to which the B-note holder is entitled to consent.  Some loan servicing decisions typically requiring B-note holder consent are:

  • Foreclosure of the mortgaged property
  • Acceleration of the A/B loan upon a borrower default
  • Releases of collateral from the A/B loan
  • Assumptions of the A/B loan by a third party borrower
  • Extensions of the scheduled amortization payments or final maturity date of the A/B loan

If you have any questions, commentary or stories to share, please post a comment.


 

The Ox and the Ditch: FAQ - Reduce the Commitment? Monthly Statements? New Written Agreements?

Guest Writer: Brenda Brown, Winstead PC

More from ourTough Times FAQs series:

FAQ #4 -  Do I need to reduce the commitment amount after sending a Notice of Default?

  • Typically, no – once the loan is declared to be in default, or once the maturity of the loan is accelerated, the lender has no on-going funding obligation – but confirm this in the documents.
  • The lender typically is not required to fund current loan allocations or grant new loan allocations.
  • Communicate clearly in writing to the Borrower that the lender has no further obligation to the fund and negotiations, inspections, administrations and even making future draws during a draw period (whether under a construction loan or a partial disbursed loan) do not amount to waivers of pre-existing defaults or can be considered obligations for future fundings.

FAQ #5 -  After a Default Notice, should I send statements showing Regular Monthly Interest or statements showing interest at the Default Rate?

  • Statements to the borrower should reflect the Default Rate of interest (rather than the prior regular interest rate), late fees, and any other fees due the lender (such as legal fees) – all of which usually do not appear in the "standard" statement.
  • So, typically it is best to STOP sending the regular monthly statements.

FAQ #6 -  What else should I put in writing?

  • Agreements Regarding Interim or Protective Advances
  • Forbearance Agreement

All of these first six questions underscore the fact that the status of the property and the loan must be looked at with current and fresh eyes so that the opportunities for solutions are enhanced, and the risks of encountering questions of waiver are avoided.

To read the entire Tough Times FAQ series, please click here.

Please post comments or questions below.
 

The Ox and the Ditch: FAQ - First Steps in a Loan Default? Types of Default? Alternatives to Calling a Default?

Guest Writer: Brenda Brown, Winstead PC

This is a special series of blog entries in which we provide some quick answers tolenders' frequently asked questions (FAQ).  Two things should be kept in mind. First, none of these questions can be answered in a vacuum. Questions should be considered with a thorough review of the file and an interview with appropriate loan officers. And secondly, many of the questions are worth revisiting from time to time because subsequent events will impact the answers.

Without further ado:

FAQ #1 -  The Borrower is how far behind – now what?

  • Analyze the entire situation: the collateral, the loan documents, the file, any co-lender or intercreditor agreements, financials on the parties, the market - in other words, the entire picture. Act like you're about to own it.
  • Consider restructuring – But send a "Discussion Letter" – to help avoid waiver of lender's rights under the loan documents
  • Determine whether a default – as defined in the loan documents – has occurred. If so, consider sending Notice of Default and Notice of Acceleration.
  • Generally Borrower has "terminal euphoria" and no reason to change unless it is in default.

FAQ #2 -  What if the default was not a monetary default?

  • "Default" vs. "Event of Default" – check defined terms in the loan documents.
  • Look for Grace / Cure Periods to see if expired.

FAQ #3 -  What can I do besides calling a default?

  • Alternatives to calling a default include à Restructure (i.e., amend the loan documents so the borrower is no longer in default – if the borrower's financial deterioration is not too great)
  • Simple Notice of Default à Just to create a written record that it exists and is continuing.

To read the entire Tough Times FAQ series, please click here.

Please post comments or questions below.
 

The Insolvency Exclusion to Cancellation of Debt (COD) Income; The Effect of Exempt Assets Under the Carlson Rule (Part 2 of 2)

Guest Writer - Mike Cook, Winstead PC

2nd in a series of 2 postings
(Part 1: The Insolvency Exclusion to Cancellation of Debt (COD) Income;
The Effect of Exempt Assets Under the Carlson Rule
)

The Court, having determined that the use of “assets” was ambiguous, pointed out that “[t]he stated purpose of the 1980 Bankruptcy Tax Act was to ‘accommodate bankruptcy policy and tax policy.’” Both Senate and House reports indicate that the proposed insolvency exception in Section 108(a)(1)(B) was intended to ensure that an insolvent debtor outside of bankruptcy (like a debtor coming out of bankruptcy who is accorded a ‘fresh start’ under Federal bankruptcy laws) is not to be burdened with an immediate tax liability.

The Tax Court, however, concluded that although an asset of a debtor may be exempt from the claims of creditors under applicable law, if that asset and the debtor’s other assets exceed the debtor’s liabilities, the debtor has the ability to pay an immediate tax on income from discharged indebtedness. By implication, therefore, the same Congress that decided that it was in the public interest that exempt assets be removed from the reach of creditors so that debtors could obtain a fresh start intended, nevertheless, to impose an income tax on the value of those assets in the event that a taxpayer negotiated a debt settlement with creditors outside of bankruptcy. In effect, the Carlson Court concluded that Congress intended to impose a penalty on taxpayers that handled their financial problems without resorting to the bankruptcy court.

Under the Carlson rule, an individual with substantial exempt assets pays a high penalty for not filing bankruptcy. The opposite viewpoint, however, is that the reason the Tax Court has sided with the government is because the cases from the late 1980s showed the gross disparity in tax treatment that could occur from the differences in exempt assets allowed from state to state. In Texas, a person with substantial exempt assets could successfully take an insolvency position under the old law. It should be noted that only the Tax Court has addressed the issue, and if the economic conditions currently being experienced produce the same quantity of workouts from commercial debt (COD from residential loans is currently excluded from gross income) as occurred in the 1980s, the issue of whether exempt assets should be excluded from the insolvency calculation will surely reach several courts of appeal.
 

The Insolvency Exclusion to Cancellation of Debt (COD) Income; The Effect of Exempt Assets Under the Carlson Rule (Part 1 of 2)

Guest Writer - Mike Cook, Winstead PC

Part 1 of 2

During the current economic crisis, debtors will be negotiating workouts with lenders and if the debtors successfully obtain debt relief, they will also be seeking tax relief from the taxation of COD income. The ability to use the broadest exclusion from COD income, the insolvency exclusion, has been severely restricted in recent years. The relief from taxation of COD income by reason of insolvency of a taxpayer has a common law history, but it was codified in 1980 as Section 108(a)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 made it clear that a purpose of the statutory insolvency exclusion was to put insolvent taxpayers on the same footing as those who filed bankruptcy, which also excludes COD income from taxation. But recently the Tax Court has penalized taxpayers for not filing bankruptcy; the insolvency exclusion does not now produce the same tax results as does bankruptcy. So are debtors better off filing bankruptcy than entering into a debt settlement with lenders?

When an individual files bankruptcy and is relieved of personal liability, the debtor comes out of bankruptcy with his/her exempt assets and there is no taxation of the relief of liability because COD is not income pursuant to Section 108(a)(1)(A). In the late 1980s, when the banking and real estate industries collapsed in the southwest United States, taxpayers relied on old case law to the effect that their exempt assets were not included in the insolvency calculation. The IRS seemed to back away from its initial litigating position and agreed with the taxpayers’ exempt asset position, but in the 1990s the IRS put taxpayers on notice that its position was that the insolvency calculation should be calculated without inclusion of the exempt assets. The Tax Court subsequently addressed the issue in Carlson v Commissioner, 116 T.C. 87 (2001) and it adopted the IRS’ position.

The Carlson Court noted with some frustration that Congress did not define the word “insolvency” or “assets” as used in Section 108(a)(1)(B) and turned to several dictionaries to find the meaning of “asset.” The court noted three definitions: (i) the property of a deceased person subject by law to the payment of his or her debts and legacies; (ii) the entire property of a person, association, corporation, or estate applicable or subject to the payment of debts; and (iii) the items on a balance sheet showing the book value of property owned. The first two definitions support an exclusion of exempt assets while the third definition supports an inclusion.

Evaluating Material Adverse Change (MAC) Clauses in the Loan Default Context (Part 2 of 2)

Guest Writer - Christopher T. Nixon, Winstead PC

In my earlier posting, I introduced this topic, and addressed several “challenges” in the meaning of the MAC clause itself in the particular factual setting of a distressed debt: is the change “material?” is the change “adverse?”
I then noted that a lender should be prepared for the borrower to contest such default declaration in the event the answer to any of the following questions is “Yes.”
Here are several more questions:

2. Do the loan documents contain a subjective MAC clause and require the lender to act reasonably or in good faith?
If the loan documents contain a subjective MAC clause, the borrower should review the loan documents to determine if the lender has a duty to act in "good faith" in determining whether a "material adverse change" has occurred, or whether such determination must be "reasonable." Furthermore, in interpreting the meaning of a subjective MAC clause, the parties should each determine whether "reasonableness" and "good faith" standards are implied by the particular state laws governing the loan documents.

3. Are there multiple inconsistent MAC clauses in the loan documents?
In the event the loan documents contain multiple inconsistent MAC clauses, a question of fact may arise as to whether the MAC clauses are enforceable.

4. Is the language of the MAC clause unclear?
The parties should pay particular attention to word choice and consider every word in the MAC clause in light of the circumstances of the particular transaction. Exacting language is particularly critical with respect to any negotiated carve-outs from the MAC clause. In addition, all applicable definitions must be carefully examined.

Please post a comment with any questions, comments or you own experience – real or hypothetical!
 

Evaluating Material Adverse Change (MAC) Clauses in the Loan Default Context (Part 1 of 2)

Guest Writer - Christopher T. Nixon, Winstead PC

In an earlier posting we briefly covered the importance distinction between a “monetary” default and a non-monetary default. One non-monetary clause getting increased attention in the “material adverse change” clause. This is the first of a two-part series on this topic.

Commercial lenders often include Material Adverse Change (MAC) clauses in their loan documents, especially in transactions involving the release of funds over time, such as credit facilities, revolving lines of credit or cash advances on asset-based transactions or in real estate transactions, earn-outs or some other form of future funding. A MAC clause is typically broad and provides that the occurrence of a "material adverse change" constitutes an event of default by the borrower under the loan documents. A “material adverse change” is then defined to include changes in business, operations or the financial condition of the borrower.

Lenders typically are cautious in declaring that a borrower default under commercial loan documents has occurred as a result of a “material adverse change." The more broad the MAC clause, the more uncertainty the lender has in evaluating whether the MAC clause is applicable to the alleged "material adverse change."

Case law may also deter lenders from declaring a borrower default based solely on a broad MAC clause. Courts have not yet developed a standard test in evaluating MAC clauses. Courts will carefully review the language of the MAC clause and the extrinsic evidence, if necessary, to determine whether the MAC clause is applicable.

Continue Reading...

What is Your Lender Doing with Your Receivables? (Part 3: Lockbox Accounts, Full Notification and Dominion of Funds)

Guest Writer - Nelson Block, Winstead PC

3rd in a series of 3 postings
(Part 1: Establishing a Security Interest in Receivables)
(Part 2: Funds in Deposit Accounts and the Account Control Agreement)

In order to capture checks sent in for payment, the lender will often create a lockbox account, usually at the bank where the borrower does business. The lockbox agreement provides that all envelopes addressed to the borrower that are received at a post office box under the bank’s control – the lockbox – will be opened and checks deposited in a special account which is either set up with the lender or covered by an account control agreement. Letters and other items received in the lockbox are sent to the borrower.

In addition, account debtors are notified to pay their accounts by mailing their remittances to the lockbox. This arrangement is “full notification,” as distinguished from an agreement with the borrower to only notify its customers after an event of default. Lenders refer to this full notification feature, coupled with the lockbox and deposit account, as “dominion of funds” because the lender now has a security interest, as well as some measure of control, over the entire process by which the borrower’s cash flow is received.

Once received, the lender may wait for one to three days before crediting the loan balance in order for the checks to go through the clearinghouse process. Borrowers sometimes contract for these clearing periods, or “float days,” for a time that is longer than may actually be required for checks to clear, permitting the lender to continue to charge interest on the loan balance. Once the cleared funds are credited to the loan, the lender will be in a position to advance fresh funds upon the purchase of inventory or the creation of new accounts receivable.

If you have any unusual experiences or stories on these topics, please post a comment.

What is Your Lender Doing with Your Receivables? (Part 2: Funds in Deposit Accounts and the Account Control Agreement)

Guest Writer - Nelson Block, Winstead PC

2nd in a series of 3 postings
(Part 1: Establishing a Security Interest in Receivables)

But the ordering created by the filing of financing statements only provides protection when the collateral is accounts. When the customer who owes on the account – the “account debtor” – pays by sending the borrower a check, the filed financing statement does not perfect the lender’s security interest in the funds represented by the check once it has been placed in the company’s bank account. At that point, the nature of the collateral changes and, unless the proceeds are “identifiable cash proceeds” which can be traced by the lender, the lender must have a security interest in the bank account. If the lender is the bank where the account is maintained, then the creation of a security interest will be sufficient to perfect. Usually the bank lender’s documents will also contain a right of set off, which is not a security interest but gives the lender the right to take the funds in the account upon a default in the loan. If the lender is not the bank where the account is maintained, then in addition to the lender’s security interest, it will need an account control agreement. This is a three-party document signed by the lender, the borrower, and the bank where the account is maintained. The most significant feature of the account control agreement is the bank’s agreement to honor payment instructions only from the lender, not from the borrower, after the lender has given written notice to do so.

Next: Lockbox Accounts, Full Notification and Dominion of Funds

If you have any unusual experiences or stories about deposit accounts and control agreements, please post a comment.

 

What is Your Lender Doing with Your Receivables? (Part 1: Establishing a Security Interest in Receivables)

Guest Writer - Nelson Block, Winstead PC

1st in a series of 3 postings

A business’s accounts receivable are one of its most valuable assets, not only to the business but to its lender. In an ongoing business, the continual turn of accounts receivable on a frequent basis make them a reliable source of revenue and, therefore, of collateral support for financing the business.

The steps necessary to secure the lender in its position in the receivables are sometimes confusing to the business owner. Here are the steps by which a lender obtains its secured position in its customer’s accounts.

In the case of businesses which sell inventory, the receivable is created when the inventory is sold on credit. The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) governs security interests in inventory, accounts receivable and other kinds of personal property. It provides that a lender establishes or “perfects” its position against other creditors by filing a financing statement (form UCC-1) stating the type of collateral with the proper filing officer – the Texas Secretary of State’s Office for entities formed under Texas law. The first creditor to file a financing statement has first priority. In such cases, the process of gaining collateral in the “accounts” (the UCC term for accounts receivable) begins even before the inventory is sold. Between a lender who has a secured position in inventory and its proceeds filed before a lender who has security in accounts, the inventory-and-proceeds-secured lender takes priority over the accounts-secured lender.

Next: Funds in Deposit Accounts and the Account Control Agreement

If you have any unusual experiences or stories about securing a lien on account receivables, please post a comment.

Falling Markets Require Borrowing Base Reductions

Guest Writer - Dan Susie, Winstead PC

A "borrowing base" is a financing structure where loan funds are disbursed NOT on a "cost incurred" basis, but rather are disbursed based upon a limited audit or information from across the collateral pool.

This structure often appears in oil and gas financing structures, and some times in loans to production (high volume) home builders.  Given the current prices of oil and gas, and of the home building market, this is the season of borrowing base reductions – because the value of the collateral no longer supports the loan or the amount outstanding.

Lenders should consider the following issues, steps and precautions in connection with any borrowing base reduction:

  • In the case of a syndication, review the borrowing base determination provisions carefully to conform to the requirements of lender approval for the reduction.
  • Comply with the provisions of the credit agreement with respect to the payout of the borrowing base deficiency.
  • The borrowing base reduction and any change in the monthly commitment reduction amount must be confirmed in writing.  Use a form of borrowing base adjustment letter approved by counsel.  Where a change in the repayment terms is agreed to, amend the credit agreement rather than using a borrowing base adjustment letter, and make sure the amendment includes a release of all claims to date.
  • Consider additional collateral and/or modification of the terms of the payout for those borrowers who cannot pay the entire deficiency in accordance with the terms of the credit agreement.
  • If additional collateral is offered by a borrower to reduce or eliminate a borrowing base deficiency, obtain title information regarding any new properties and promptly file new mortgages to perfect liens against such collateral.
  • In the case of a syndication, review the borrowing base determination provisions carefully to conform to the requirements of lender approval for the reduction.

If you have any other suggestions, or if you have any questions, please post a comment.
 

Should a Borrower Intentionally Default on a CMBS Loan?

By Guest Writer – Christopher T. Nixon, Winstead PC

CMBS Master Servicers typically lack the ability to modify a CMBS loan to preemptively address a potential loan problem. A CMBS borrower frustrated with such inability may elect to purposefully default on the loan to circumvent the restrictions placed on the Master Servicer and force the transfer of the loan to the Special Servicer. The borrower's expectation is that the Special Servicer will have the ability and agree to modify the CMBS loan to address the potential loan problem.

Risks:  If it is apparent to the Special Servicer that the borrower intentionally defaulted on the loan, the Special Servicer may elect to accelerate the debt and pursue foreclosure of the real estate collateral. The Special Servicer may determine that an aggressive foreclosure of the defaulted loan will maximize recovery for the bondholders as compared to attempting to negotiate a loan workout with an untrustworthy borrower acting in a manner detrimental to the economic interests of the REMIC Trust in which the CMBS loan is pooled.

Potential Solution:  Rather than taking the inflammatory step of defaulting on the CMBS loan to reach the Special Servicer to address a potential loan problem, a borrower should consider discussing the potential loan problem with the Master Servicer. If the Master Servicer determines that the loan problem constitutes a "reasonably foreseeable default," the Master Servicer may have the ability under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) to transfer the loan to the Special Servicer at that time (without waiting for an actual loan default to occur) to address the loan problem. A Special Servicer may be more inclined to consider a loan modification as compared to a foreclosure if the Master Servicer and borrower present the loan problem to the Special Servicer at this stage. The effectiveness of this approach will largely depend on the quality and sophistication of the Master Servicer and Special Servicer. Given the current bad economy, Master Servicers are increasingly aware of the need to proactively discuss borrower loan problem concerns and to involve the Special Servicer early in such discussions.

Tips for the Borrower:

  • Be honest about the potential loan problem when discussing it with the Master Servicer.
  • Provide sufficient information to the Master Servicer for it to objectively determine that the potential loan problem constitutes a "reasonably foreseeable default."
  • Do not create a potential loan problem merely to seek economic concessions from the Special Servicer. The borrower should have a sincere concern that a loan default is likely to occur if the loan problem is not promptly addressed.
     

Key Differences Between CMBS Loans and Portfolio Loans in the Loan Default Scenario (Part 2)

Guest Writer – Christopher T. Nixon, Winstead PC
(2nd in a series of 2 postings)

In my prior posting (Part 1),   I covered some of the key differences between a workout of a CMBS loan and a workout of a portfolio loan.

Here are some more:

  • Flexibility.  Due to REMIC rules and the restrictions and limitations set forth in the PSA, a Special Servicer is not able, or has less flexibility than a portfolio lender, to substitute collateral, take additional collateral, capitalize past due interest, bifurcate the debt, take an equity or contingent interest position, operate an REO property, or lend additional money as a loan default solution.
  • No CMBS Loan Dragnet Clause.  The borrower has no other source of repayment for a Special Servicer to consider in the workout of a CMBS loan, which may not be the case in a portfolio loan workout scenario.
  • SPE Provisions.  A CMBS loan borrower is bound by bankruptcy-remote SPE provisions in its organizational documents.

a.) Bankruptcy Remote.  There are structural impediments to the borrower's ability to file bankruptcy. Even if the borrower files bankruptcy, the CMBS lender is likely the only secured creditor.
b.) Single Purpose.  The borrower has no ability to substitute or add collateral to address a CMBS loan default.

  • Carve-out Guaranty.  While many portfolio loans are recourse loans, CMBS loans are typically non-recourse. With respect to a CMBS loan, the borrower and the principals of the borrower may face recourse liability for certain bad acts described in the loan documents.
  • Cash Management.  Many CMBS loans have a lockbox cash management component, which facilitates the control of cash collateral. Portfolio loans typically do not have any such component.
  • Regular Borrower Financial Reporting.  While portfolio loans typically do not have rigid borrower financial reporting requirements, regular borrower financial reporting requirements of a CMBS loan keeps the Servicer apprised of the financial status of the real estate collateral. The information in such financial reports may be critical to a Special Servicer in making an informed decision about how to address a loan default.
  • Property Management Control.  CMBS loans typically assign to the lender the right to replace the property manager with a lender-approved property manager. Portfolio loans typically do not have any such assignment provision.


The differences between the two types of loans are significant. And this list is not all-inclusive. So, be careful – and as self servicing as this sounds, use legal counsel who is experienced in handling CMBS loan workouts.

If you have any questions or  suggestions, please post a comment.
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Key Differences Between CMBS Loans and Portfolio Loans in the Loan Default Scenario (Part 1)

Guest Writer – Christopher T. Nixon, Winstead PC
(1st in a series of 2 postings)

In the commercial loan default scenario, CMBS Special Servicers are not able to provide to borrowers many of the accommodations that may be provided to borrowers by portfolio lenders. CMBS Special Servicers are subject to many more restrictions and limitations than to which portfolio lenders are subject in a loan default situation.

Understanding the key differences between CMBS loan workouts and portfolio loan workouts will facilitate a borrower's efforts in attempting to address a CMBS loan default with a Special Servicer. Some of the key differences between CMBS loan workouts and portfolio loan workouts are as follows:

  • Standards. A portfolio lender applies its own individualized standards in addressing a loan default; and a third-party servicer will administer the loan in accordance with the servicing standard articulated in its servicing agreement with the lender. A CMBS Special Servicer must administer the loans in accordance with the Servicing Standard set forth in the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the "PSA") and comply with REMIC rules to protect the federal income tax-free status of the REMIC Trust in which the CMBS loan is pooled.
  • Continuity of Relationship. A portfolio loan has continuity in the origination, servicing, and workout of the loan. The portfolio lender has an ongoing relationship with the borrower and retains tight control over any third-party loan servicer. On the other hand, a CMBS loan involves the fragmenting of the obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities for the loan between multiple parties involved.
  • Workout Goals. A portfolio lender attempts to preserve the value of the asset and, in some instances, its relationship with the borrower. A CMBS Special Servicer attempts to preserve the integrity of the Trust, while maximizing recovery for the bondholders.
  • Preemptive Abilities. A portfolio lender may make additional loan advances or enter into preemptive loan modifications to address a potential loan default. A Master Servicer typically lacks the ability to preemptively address a potential loan default.
  • Due Diligence Review. A CMBS Special Servicer's review of due diligence may be more challenging than that of a portfolio lender because the Special Servicer is often not familiar with the loan before the transfer of the loan from the Master Servicer to the Special Servicer (i.e., the "Servicing Transfer Event").


My next posting will list several other differences.  If you have any questions or suggestions, please post a comment.
 

Stay in Banker's Good Graces by Coming Clean When Money's Tight (Part 3)

Guest Writer – Nelson Block, Winstead PC
(3rd in a series of 3 postings)

The strategies:

Be realistic
Borrowers sometimes suffer from terminal euphoria, believing that current market conditions will change, the business climate will improve, a new investor can readily be found, or the company can be sold quickly. Jump these hurdles quickly. Be prepared for difficult times.

Avoid surprising the lender
If there is going to be bad news, the borrower gets a jump ahead by being frank with the lender about adverse business results. This course builds credibility and trust, and creates an impression that management knows its business.

Plan ahead
The lender probably receives disappointing news about business performance much better if it is accompanied by a plan identifying the problems and outlining solutions. Even an outline of issues may be helpful. If management is not certain what action to take, the lender may have ideas or suggest outside experts who can offer experience and expertise. Accurate, current financial information is vital.

Understand the options
If the business cannot resolve its problems with changes to its business plan, assume that the lender will act to resolve them. The company’s options include, in descending order of desirability: move to another lender, wind down sufficiently to regain profitability, wind down to generate enough cash to pay off the loan, liquidate, or have the lender liquidate.

Get the loan in line
Often, asset-based lenders maintain the right to reduce advance ratios and strengthen eligibility requirements for collateral. If the business continues to require more money than its borrowing base justifies, the lender may use these tools to ratchet down the loan until the business’s performance is again in line with the amount advanced on the loan.

Maintain the initiative
Lenders know that everyone benefits when the borrower runs its business, even in a workout or liquidation. The company’s management knows the business better than the lender, and is in a much better position to understand issues, see problems and implement necessary changes. Lenders will try to take a role of approval, rather than proposal, during the workout.

 

Stay in Banker's Good Graces by Coming Clean When Money's Tight (Part 2)

Guest Writer – Nelson Block, Winstead PC
2nd in a series of 3 postings


When market conditions worsen, the business’s deficiencies can outstrip the accumulation of assets that supports new loans.  Assume that on January 1, the borrower’s accounts receivable are $100,000, and the lender, using an advance ratio of 75%, lends $75,000.  The borrower uses the $75,000 to pay employees, taxes, rent, utilities and purchase inventory.  But adverse market conditions cause business to fall off, and on April 1 accounts receivable are only $80,000.  During the intervening 90 days, unless the company’s management was farsighted (and assuming it already adjusted for annual seasonal changes in business), it purchased the same amount of inventory and kept the same number of employees.  Moreover, the borrower’s non-payroll fixed costs – taxes, rent and utilities – have stayed the same.  So, on April 1, the borrowing calculation is 75% of $80,000, or $60,000, but the borrower still requires $75,000 to operate.

The typical pressures of business loom larger in a downturn.  The borrower, which needed daily working capital when it obtained the loan, is now strapped and using cash quickly. Management was already under stress from the many issues facing it when it took out the loan, and now confronts all those problems plus two more – a troubled business and a lender that wants to get paid sooner than expected. Time, which was short during any business day, is even more precious now, as the company’s management spends more time analyzing its business problems, dealing with employees (one of the most difficult and worrisome activities in a workout), putting off creditors, and meeting with the lender.  Certain strategies work well in such situations. See the next posting for a list of strategies.
 

Stay in Banker's Good Graces by Coming Clean When Money's Tight (Part 1)

Guest Writer – Nelson Block, Winstead PC
1st in a series of 3 postings


While the experts argue about whether we are in a recession, or whether the Houston area is immune to it, those of us in business need to prepare for the challenges of an economic downturn and what to do about it. An important aspect of that analysis is what to do about your loan. Sometimes during the life of a loan, the borrower’s performance may be impaired or, just as importantly, may be viewed by the lender as impaired. Warning signs of a distressed loan include weakened cash flow, decreasing accounts receivable, rising costs, and build-up of inventory. In a revolving credit loan, where the amount of the loan varies as a function of the borrower’s collateral, poor economic performance translates into a loan covenant default because the borrower is not in compliance with its borrowing base.

How can a default arise in a revolving line of credit, where the amount of money advanced only increases when the borrower’s assets increase? The default often occurs because the loan anticipates cash flow. The borrower only sought a loan because its accounts receivable do not pay quickly enough to supply a reliable source of regular working capital. Its monthly cash needs were not being met by the payment of its accounts receivable.
 

From Across the Pond: The European View (Day 4)

Day Four Report from Contributing Writer Brenda Brown (with Keith Mullen and Lou Strawn) in Europe

On this fourth day of our trip, I awoke to yet more news of the ever-evolving, now global ‘credit crisis’ during our stay in Munich, where we are attending a real estate conference. It's great to be back in Munich (where I studied during college) to experience the Bavarian culture again, and to readjust my ear to the unique Bavarian accent. I'm amazed at how quickly my ability to even "think" in German (auf Deutsch denken) returns to me. While Keith Mullen and Lou Strawn listen to CNBC Europe and read the English papers, I focus on the German media.

German news highlighted the general instability and frozen financial markets now spreading across Europe, the 40% loss of value of the Royal Bank of Scotland, Iceland’s nationalization of banks, possible bankruptcy of its banking system, and the current, virtual standstill in commercial real estate finance.

Uncertainty in the financial markets seems a greater concern than illiquidity. However, one has to wonder, and ask the age-old question, “which came first?”

The daily changing financial crisis has caused a general perception that real estate investment capital will remain, in large part, on the sidelines during 2009, waiting not only for the “bottom” in valuations, but also for a sense that conditions are stable.

Predictions indicate that over the next year future loans will involve significantly lower risk, and therefore will be ‘safer’ for lenders (due, in part, to better income coverage and value ratios). The headline of a front page article in the Immobilien Zeitung (the German real estate trade newspaper) sums up the apparent turn to avoidance of risk: Investment Markets - 2009 will be ‘the Year of Safety’.

German TV this morning also surprised me when I heard the newscasters telling people not to take their money out of the banks.

The three of us are amazed at how the Germans share the same concerns as we do. At a cocktail party last night, conversing with the locals, it was clear that the 40-something generation is concerned, but generally believes it will work out. By contrast, our parents' generation seems to have a grave concern that we'll see a crisis that may take decades to recover.

If you have any observations or comments, or any questions that you'd like us to ask during our EU trip, please "post" a comment.
 

From Across the Pond: The European View (Day 3)

Day Three Report from Keith Mullen and Lou Strawn in Europe

On this third day, Keith Mullen, Brenda Brown and I attended the opening session of a European-based real estate conference.

The opening meeting was a Q&A session with a panel composed of the head of a major German bank, the head of the Morgan Stanley European Real Estate Fund and the former chairman of the Euro Hype Fund. The room was standing room only, and the subject was (you guessed it) "Subprime, Credit Crunch Nonperforming Loans . . . The Year After (Strategies for dealing with the crisis)."

What is clear is that the Europeans are as concerned about their banking industry as their U.S. counterparts. The panel stated that this crisis has migrated from a "credit crisis" to a fundamental "trust crisis," and that trust will not be restored by more or stronger regulation, or enforcement, but by the investment behavior of the banking institutions themselves. Upon reflection, it is an interesting and alarming thought.

On a brighter note, the panel emphatically stated that there was no real danger of EU depositors losing funds as of last Friday (October 3rd), when it became clear that members in the EU would commit (and had committed) bailout capital similar to the U.S. Germany committed 520 billion euros; Ireland committed 400 billion euros; and Holland a similar amount. (This amount is in excess of the U.S. bailout.) However, these members did not take the buy "toxic debt instruments" like the U.S., but instead, they elected to directly back bank deposits.

The panel also discussed the volatility suffered by EU banks due to the swings in "mark to market" rule interpretations -- it was almost as if the panel was describing the U.S. banks. And, of course, the panel at length focused on the need for transparency, and the "German mortgage bond," which we know as the"covered bond."

No one clapped at the end of the session.  Everyone simply left the room.

If you have any observations or comments, or any questions that you'd like us to ask during our EU trip, please "post" a comment.